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research is thorough, the engagements
are somewhat hard to follow, and the
adjacent maps of Iraqi air bases do
not provide much clarity. Dedicated
diagrams would have been invaluable.
While Cooper does an admirable job
of comparing differing accounts of
complicated engagements and suggesting the most likely sequence of events,
his reliance on oral history colors his
overall assessments of the performance
of the Tomcat and its aircrews. It is
unclear whether Cooper believes the
performance of the Tomcat is underappreciated or that it is appreciated
correctly and he merely wants to provide
context. His three “contradictions” never
are dealt with explicitly, but the evidence
suggests that they—especially the latter
two: that the Tomcat lacked the proper
equipment and that Iraqi pilots knew to
avoid its powerful radar—are accurate.
Cooper goes out of his way to commend
the performance of Tomcat aircrews,
attributing their lack of air-to-air
victories to their strict adherence to
the rules of engagement and tactics;
however, two of the incidents described
feature some obvious mistakes
regarding both. Finally, there are
minor editorial quibbles involving the
aforementioned “First” and “Second”
Persian Gulf Wars, the occasional
improper use of military acronyms, and
his use of Soviet instead of the more
familiar NATO designations for some
weapon systems (e.g., referring to the
R-40D instead of the AA-6 Acrid),
but this may be an idiosyncrasy of the
military aviation enthusiast community.
Despite having heard these same stories
for years—some of them from the same
people Cooper interviewed—I definitely
learned something new from In the
Claws of the Tomcat. Cooper describes
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the Iranian and Iraqi pilots that the
U.S. Navy faced from 1987 to 2000 as
experienced combat veterans, and his
book rightly credits their performance.
Naval aviation sometimes overestimates
its future performance and underestimates that of its future opponents, but
it does so (and did so) at its own peril.
JOSHUA HAMMOND

Inside the US Navy of 1812–1815, by William S.
Dudley. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press, 2021. 368 pages. $54.95.

In the first chapter of America, Sea
Power, and the World, James Bradford’s
edited textbook on the history of the
American navy, the author explains to
students and readers what he considers
to be the three elements of a modern
Navy: purpose-built warships, a professional force—in particular, a professional
officer corps—and a shore establishment
of supporting structures and bureaucracies. In large measure, naval history
across the past several generations
has tended to focus on the first two
elements, the warships and the sailors.
William S. Dudley’s new book, Inside the
US Navy of 1812–1815, is a masterwork
of depth and research that returns the
third element, the shore establishment
and bureaucracy, to the center of the history of early American naval power. In
doing so, Dudley offers not only a great
service to our understanding of the U.S.
Navy’s past but also key reminders of the
breadth of naval topics that require our
attention in the present and the future.
In June 1812, when the United States
declared war on Great Britain, the U.S.
Navy was not ready. Americans were
taking on the most powerful maritime
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force in the world, yet while Congress
began raising armies and activating
militia units it did very little to prepare
the nation’s maritime defenses and its
navy. Despite the fact that the British
had been engulfed in a long conflict
with France, the Royal Navy in North
American waters still outnumbered
and outgunned the U.S. Navy when
the war began. Yet while America was
lacking in number of ships, the quality and professionalism of its officers
offered some high points. The talents of
commanders such as Isaac Hull, Stephen
Decatur, and John Rodgers would result
in surprising single-ship victories and
other successes early in the conflict.
Over the last decade, as Americans
commemorated the bicentennial of
the War of 1812—while the British
largely ignored it—there has been a
refreshing resurgence in scholarship
on the conflict. However, the glory
of the early frigate duels, the smallsquadron combats on the lakes, and the
operational and strategic execution of
the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy have
tended to remain at the center of this
new scholarship. Much of the narrative
of the war overlooks the key foundation
on which the U.S. Navy—as is any navy,
quite frankly—was built: the administrative and bureaucratic functions run by
the Secretary of the Navy to design and
build the ships, recruit and promote the
officers and men, supply the combat
units with everything they needed
to fight and survive, and provide the
infrastructure to maintain and repair the
ships. Dudley’s book corrects this oversight with the depth that historians of all
kinds aspire to achieve in their work.
Dudley served most of his career as
a historian at the Naval History and
Heritage Command (or the Naval
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Historical Center, as it was called
during most of his career), holding the
position of Director of Naval History
from 1995 to 2004. During his time as
an official historian of the U.S. Navy, he
launched and led the editorial process
that created the multiple volumes of
The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary
History, resulting in a deep understanding of the source material for any
examination of the war. It is hard to
imagine that there is another living
historian with as thorough a knowledge
of the sources as Dudley. That mastery
shows throughout the book.
The work of Secretaries of the Navy
Paul Hamilton and William Jones is at
the core of the book. Modern readers
looking back at the nineteenth century
often forget, or are surprised to discover,
that the Secretary of the Navy served as
both the administrative and operational
leader of the Navy and Marine Corps.
The position of Chief of Naval Operations was not created until the threat
of World War I presented itself, and
Hamilton and Jones were left to shoulder
the overwhelming responsibilities of
both jobs, with only a marginal staff
to support them. Dudley shows how
these leaders balanced the competing
needs and resources of the Navy—or, in
some cases, failed to balance them. He
demonstrates that the glorious victories,
particularly of Perry and Macdonough
on the Great Lakes but also of Hull and
Decatur in the Atlantic, were built on the
hard bureaucratic work that the naval
administrators put into supplying, funding, and supporting the combat forces.
As the war develops through the book’s
chapters, readers are left time and again
to realize that it is the often-overlooked
and sometimes boring elements of the
naval past that end up being decisive.
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The chapters are conveniently broken
up with subheadings that help the
reader keep track of the many threads
Dudley weaves throughout the book.
However, with so much detail to
relate, and given the complexity of the
logistical challenges and administrative
burdens the reader must understand,
the author often employs flashbacks
and jumps through the chronology of
the war. For those who are not familiar
with the general narrative of the conflict
or the time line of events, this can
induce confusion, whereas those who
already have a clearer understanding of
the conflict will benefit from Dudley’s
ability to focus on a specific challenge
before jumping to another topic. A
reader who is new to the naval war
of 1812 should pair this book with
another (such as George Daughan’s
1812: The Navy’s War, or Andrew
Lambert’s The Challenge: Britain
against America in the Naval War of
1812 for a British viewpoint) to help
alleviate any chronological confusion.

demarcating the European war against
the Axis) or 1941 to 1945 (covering when
America had joined the fight in Europe
and the Pacific). Frank wants to give
the war in China its due, showing that
it was an integral part of a prolonged
global maelstrom. In this he succeeds.

B. J. ARMSTRONG

This haphazardness, maintains the
author, demonstrates that “contingency
rather than inevitability produced the
Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945.” But
indecision and acrimony commonly
plague debates about whether to open
a new theater—witness the caustic
debate over invading Iraq in 2003. But
a decision is a decision, no matter how
decision makers arrive at it. Few would
allege that the Iraq War stood apart
from the global war on terror because
of America’s far-from-seamless path to
Baghdad. In other words, Frank’s premise
is reasonable but far from incontestable.

Tower of Skulls: A History of the Asia-Pacific War,
July 1937–May 1942, by Richard B. Frank. New
York: W. W. Norton, 2020. 751 pages. $40.

Historian and Vietnam veteran Richard
Frank (Downfall, Guadalcanal) is on a
mission. In Tower of Skulls he sets out
to rebrand the Pacific theater of World
War II as a grand “Asia-Pacific War”
spanning from 1937 to 1945, from
imperial Japan’s invasion of China until
Japan capitulated to Allied arms. His
approach runs counter to the standard
understanding of World War II as
ranging from 1939 to 1945 (the dates
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Tower of Skulls is the first in a trilogy
that aspires to tell the full story of the
world conflict. Yet if Frank’s goal is to
fold the Sino-Japanese War into a single
Asia-Pacific War, why not turn back the
clock all the way back to 1931, when
Japan invaded Manchuria and reduced
it to a vassal state? The author rejects (p.
32) “the beguiling interpretation styled
‘The Fifteen Years’ War,’ which argues
that Japan followed a seamless path from
Manchuria in 1931 to the USS Missouri
in 1945.” Why? Because prominent backers of the Manchurian adventure in 1931
came to oppose fresh entanglements
in China by 1937. Accordingly Tokyo,
rather than initiating the new enterprise
in an orderly manner, took “staggering,
stumbling steps” into war in China.

But I quibble. Widening our memory
of World War II to encompass what
happened in China is a worthwhile enterprise, no matter whether you regard
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